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TALK IS CHEAP, BUT A PICTURE IS WORTH A
THOUSAND WORDS: PRIVACY RIGHTS IN THE
ERA OF CAMERA PHONE TECHNOLOGY
By Alan Kato Ku*
I. INTRODUCTION
What recent technological advance has raised the ire of
such diverse parties as bookstore owners, members of health
clubs, facility staff at General Motors, and pop icon Britney
Spears?' Camera phones.! Since camera phones bear no
marked difference from cell phones,3 distinguishing between
them is not easy. Camera phone popularity has rapidly in-
creased in the United States since they were introduced to
the U.S. market.' Although six million of the estimated 148
million cellular customers currently own camera phones,' the
number is expected to explode based on market research sug-
gesting more than half of all U.S. cell phones will be capable
* Research Editor, Santa Clara Law Review, Volume 45; J.D. Candidate, Santa
Clara University School of Law; A.B., Economics and B.S. Statistics, University
of California, Berkeley. The author wishes to thank all of the women in his life:
his mother Betty, his wife Linda, and all the ladies of the Santa Clara Law Re-
view who contributed to this comment.
1. Anita Hamilton, Coolest Inventions-Camera Phones, TIME, Nov. 17,
2003, at 73.
2. Id. Camera phones merge the functionality of a digital camera with that
of a regular cellular phone. See id. They have been regularly reported on in the
press as one of the newest technological trends. See id.
3. Id.
4. See Jeffrey Bartash, Get the Picture? Wireless Phones Do, C.B.S.
MARKETWATCH.COM, Apr. 3, 2003, at
http://www.marketwatch.com/news/story.asp?guid=%7BA13DEEA8%2D3816%2
D45D3%2D843F%2D8304A436E185%7D&siteid=mktw (last updated Dec. 16,
2003, last visited Apr. 21, 2005) (noting that camera phones are becoming the
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of taking photographs by 2007.
Camera phones have proven more than a novelty, as evi-
denced by their use in assisting law enforcement by capturing
images of criminals or crimes in progress.7 Nevertheless, the
new technology is quickly facing concerns in three areas: (1)
its threat to privacy; (2) the theft of copyrighted materials;
and, (3) corporate espionage.' And, as a means of addressing
the proposed danger, Saudi Arabia has taken the extraordi-
nary step of banning camera phones altogether.9
Among the legal issues raised, the threat to privacy has
been the impetus behind municipal regulations that limit the
use of camera phones in certain public settings,' ° and the pro-
hibition against use in certain commercial establishments
like sports clubs." As the public comes to terms with this
new technology, privacy rights face another device that
erodes the expectation of privacy in public settings. This
comment addresses the potential legal responses to address
the privacy concerns raised by camera phones and how these
legal responses may implicate and apply to succeeding tech-
nologies that will inevitably further erode society's expecta-
tion of privacy in a public setting.
First, this comment will present a brief discussion on the
legal definition of privacy. 2 Next, it will outline the history of
privacy laws in the United States with particular emphasis
on two major areas: the common law of torts and the juris-
prudence that has arisen from the courts' interpretation of
the Fourth Amendment provision on searches and seizures."
The two doctrines of American privacy law will set the foun-
dation for the final discussion on contemporary statutory laws
that may apply to, or have been introduced because of, the
6. Id.
7. Hamilton, supra note 1.
8. See id. The author cites to various incidents raising concerns: pictures
of undressed gym members, customers taking pictures of cookbook recipe pages,
and manufacturing sites worried about theft of product development plans. Id.
In addition, pop idol Britney Spears prohibited camera phones at a party
thrown in September 2003. Id.
9. Id.
10. See Jo Napolitano, Hold It Right There, And Drop That Camera, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 11, 2003, at G1 (citing camera phone proposals and statutes in Illi-
nois, Ohio, and Missouri).
11. Hamilton, supra note 1.
12. See discussion infra Part II.A.
13. See discussion infra Part II.B.
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disruptive technology of camera phones.14 After presenting
the legal privacy concerns associated with camera phone
technology, 5 this comment will analyze possible remedies
found in existing cases and statututes. 6 Finally, this com-
ment will propose the creation of "safe places" within a
framework of common law privacy tort remedies."
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Legal Definition of Privacy
A proper treatment of the definition of privacy is an ex-
haustive effort which has been thoroughly examined by legal
scholars. 8 The following discussion presents only a brief sur-
vey of the topic.
1. The Most Elegant of Definitions
In 1890, The Right to Privacy was published in the Har-
vard Law Review.9 Its authors, Samuel D. Warren and Louis
D. Brandeis, defined privacy as the right "to be let alone."2 °
This definition was in response to "Ir]ecent inventions and
business methods"21 that threatened the individual citizen's
"inviolate personality."2  Warren and Brandeis prophetically
worried that the recent introduction of photography combined
with the press would cause "'what is whispered in the
closet... [to] be proclaimed from the house-tops.' 23  The
"right... to be let alone" has remained a workable definition
of privacy though it appears in many forms. One author, for
instance, describes the right as the control over all dissemina-
14. See discussion infra Part II.C.
15. See discussion infra Part III.
16. See discussion infra Part IV.
17. See discussion infra Part V.
18. See generally RICHARD C. TURKINGTON & ANITA L. ALLEN, PRIVACY LAW
1-16, 72-74 (1999) (surveying works of various theorists as to the definition and
nature of privacy). See also Ken Gormley, One Hundred Years of Privacy, 1992
Wis. L. REV. 1335, 1335-38 (1992) (surveying the diversity of definitions of pri-
vacy).
19. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The RhMgt to Privacy, 4 HARV.
L. REV. 193 (1890).
20. Id. at 205. The phrase "right to be let alone" was attributed by the au-
thors to a contemporary, Judge Thomas Cooley. Id. at 195.
21. Id. at 195.
22. Id. at 205.
23. Id. at 195.
2005 681
682 SANTA CLARA LA W REVIEW Vol: 45
tion of personal information. 4
When the "right... to be let alone" is paired with the ac-
companying question, "'with respect to what?,'' 5 the defini-
tion can come to mean "new and different things."26 Professor
Gormley notes that "[for Warren and Brandeis in 1890, it
meant the right to be let alone with respect to prying news-
papers and photographers." 2' Today, privacy has included the
right to be let alone with respect to the acquisition and use of
personal information.28 Ultimately, privacy under any defini-
tion will mean something different to each successive genera-
tion of Americans, with all such meanings representing "a
boundary of individualism safeguarded by the force of law.
2 9
2. Categories of Privacy
Privacy laws can be broadly categorized into two
branches, autonomous and individual privacy, ° that are re-
flective of the rights they protect. Justice Stevens described
the former as "the interest in independence in making certain
kinds of important decisions,"3 while the latter was "the indi-
vidual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters."32
The Supreme Court acknowledged the emergence of in-
24. ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967) ("[P]rivacy is the
claim of individuals... to determine for themselves when, how, and to what ex-
tent information about them is communicated to others"). See also Gormley,
supra note 18, at 1336 (listing several cross disciplinary derivations of a defini-
tion). The "right to be let alone" definition can be viewed as encompassing both
categories of privacy: autonomy and informational. See discussion supra Part
II.A.2. By its simple description, the "right . . . to be let alone" implicates
autonomy privacy. However, it also implicates informational privacy as is indi-
cated by Warren and Brandeis in describing the right of privacy to be the right
to determine "to what extent his thoughts, sentiments, and emotions shall be
communicated to others." Warren & Brandeis, supra note 19, at 198.
25. See Gormley, supra note 18, at 1342.
26. Id,
27. Id
28. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 605 (1977) (recognizing a threat to pri-
vacy in the accumulation of personal data in both private and public settings).
29. Gormley, supra note 18, at 1342.
30. See Whalen, 429 U.S. at 598-600. Cf Hill v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic
Ass'n, 865 P.2d 633, 685 (Cal. 1994) (dissenting Justice Mosk added a third
category, which he called an invasion of solitude). See generally Will Thomas
DeVries, Protecting Privacy in a Digital Age, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 283, 285-
86 n.18 (2003) (noting that there are sundry other means to broadly categorize
privacy branches).
31. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 599-600.
32. Id. at 599.
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formational privacy when it ruled in Whalen v. Rod 3 upon the
constitutionality of a New York State Health Department
procedure to log patient drug use and store it in a retrievable
database.34 The Department's actions and database were up-
held as legal. 35 However, the Court acknowledged the "threat
to privacy implicit in the accumulation of vast amounts of
personal information in computerized data banks or other
massive government files. 36  Since the late 1960s, congres-
sional efforts have been numerous in passing statutory pro-
tections to provide accountability in the collection and use of
personal data.37
B. The Historic Development ofPrivacy Laws
There is no explicit privacy protection in the Constitu-
tion, but courts have found implied privacy related rights
found in certain amendments. For example, the Fourth
Amendment's right against unreasonable searches and sei-
zures protects the individual from unwarranted government
intrusion into his personal and residential space. 3" The au-
thors of the Fourth Amendment, however, certainly could not
have imagined that a search of a citizen's home could one day
be accomplished without any physical entry whatsoever.
Thus, the courts are challenged to apply the concept of pri-
vacy rights against the backdrop of technological and societal
changes.39
1. The Courts'First Step: Privacy in the Common Law
of Torts
Though earlier judicial and academic precedents ex-
isted," the article by Warren and Brandeis received notice-
33. 429 U.S. 589.
34. Id. at 591.
35. Id. at 600.
36. Id. at 605.
37. See TURKINGTON & ALLEN, supra note 18, at 71-72 (surveying the fed-
eral statues regulating the collection and use of personal information ranging
from credit scores, student records and banking data).
38. U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and sei-
zures. ").
39. See generally Gormley, supra note 18, at 1439-41.
40. See TURKINGTON & ALLEN, supra note 18, at 22-23. See also Gormley,
supra note 18, at 1343 (noting that despite arguments to the contrary, privacy
rights were "infused" into early American common law). One of the earliest ref-
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able attention that cemented its role as being one of the first
attempts to formally articulate the right of privacy.4 The
right was based on a basic tort notion and not to any constitu-
tional right.42 A plaintiff was entitled to recovery if he or she
suffered some sort of injury to his or her own sense of indi-
viduality, which Warren and Brandeis referred to as one's
"inviolate personality."43 The right was not absolute, how-
ever. The authors noted that one would forfeit the right if one
exposed himself to the general domain," or one would forfeit
the right if the individual's matter was of "public or general
interest.""
The privacy tort was not immediately accepted but over
the course of the several decades slowly began to take hold.46
New York passed the nation's first privacy related statute in
1903, which prohibited the unauthorized use of an individ-
ual's name or likeness.47 In 1905, the Georgia Supreme Court
ruled that a plaintiff had a valid cause of action under a pri-
vacy theory when his image was used without his consent in a
newspaper advertisement.48 By the time William L. Prosser
revived interest in the area of privacy with his article in
1960,49 he was able to document a rich history of cases that
erences to privacy was a Michigan Supreme Court case holding that a defendant
who had witnessed a childbirth without the mother's consent was liable in tort.
DeMay v. Roberts, 9 N.W. 146, 149 (Mich. 1881) ("The plaintiff had a legal right
to the privacy of her apartment at such a time, and the law secures to her this
right by requiring others to observe it, and to abstain from its violation.").
41. See Gormley, supra note 18, at 1353.
42. See id at 1345. It is worth repeating that the Constitution does not ex-
plicitly mention any "right to privacy," and the constitutional basis for what we
understand today as the "right to privacy" has evolved primarily in the exten-
sive jurisprudence defining the contours of the Fourth Amendment protections
from government searches and seizures and the fundamental, decisional privacy
rights commonly associated with marriage, child rearing, and most recently,
sexual practices. See discussion infra Part II.B.3.
43. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 19, at 197-98, 205. A sense of what
Warren and Brandeis intended by the term "inviolate personality" can be gath-
ered from a contemporary case in which an actress sued to bar the publication
of an unauthorized picture of her in tights. Id. at 195 n.7, 205.
44. Id. at 199-200.
45. Id. at 214-15.
46. See TURKINGTON & ALLEN, supra note 18, at 23 (citing Professor Boh-
len). Professor Bohlen commented that the right of privacy advocated by War-
ren and Brandeis had "almost completely failed." Francis H. Bohlen, Fifty
Years of Torts, 50 HARv. L. REV. 725, 731 (1937).
47. Act of April 6, 1903, ch. 132, §§ 1-2, 1903 N.Y. Laws 308.
48. Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905).
49. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383 (1960). William L.
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had referenced the right to privacy under various circum-
stances. ° He observed that courts overwhelmingly had come
to recognize the right of privacy in some form and that only a
few states completely rejected it.51 Dean Prosser's article fur-
ther established the privacy tort by refining it into four dis-
tinct categories,52 all of which were subsequently adopted by
the Restatement (Second) of Torts (the "Restatemen').
53
Though courts have adopted the privacy torts as a valid
claim, the courts have not always ruled favorably for those
who claim a violation under any of the four categories.' For
instance, courts generally dismiss a cause of action under the
privacy tort of intrusion upon the plaintiffs seclusion or soli-
tude because of the accepted notion that there is no privacy in
a public place.55 Nevertheless, the Daily imes Democrat v.
Graham56 case granted relief to plaintiffs claim of a privacy
right in public. 7 The case involved a mother and her sons
who visited a local fair during which the woman's dress was
Prosser was the Dean of the University of California School of Law, Berkeley
when he authored this article. The author will refer to Mr. Prosser as Dean
Prosser throughout the remainder of this comment.
50. See Gormley, supra note 18, at 1355-56 n.102 (citing a representative
list of cases since 1893 in which the court either recognized or did not recognize
a right to privacy).
51. Prosser, supra note 49, at 386-88.
52. Id. at 389. Dean Prosser described the four torts as follows: "1. Intru-
sion upon the plaintiffs seclusion or solitude, or into his private affairs. 2. Pub-
lic disclosure of embarrassing private facts about the plaintiff. 3. Publicity
which places plaintiff in a false light in the public eye. 4. Appropriation, for the
defendant's advantage, of the plaintiffs name or likeness." Id.
53. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652B, 652C, 652D, 652E
(1977) (categorizing the torts as Intrusion on Seclusion (Section 652B), Appro-
priation of Name or Likeness (Section 652C), Publicity Given to Private Life
(Section 652D), and Publicity Placing Person in False Light (Section E)). See
generally Shulman v. Group W. Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469 (Cal. 1998) (providing
a thorough discussion on the privacy invasion torts and their application to
California law).
54. See Andrew Jay McClurg, Bringing Privacy Law Out of the Closet: A
Tort Theory of Liability for Intrusions in Public Places, 73 N.C. L. REV. 989,
999-1004 (1995) (surveying a plaintiffs difficulty with obtaining a remedy under
each of the four categories).
55. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 53, § 652B; McClurg,
supra note 54, at 1003-04. The lack of privacy in a public place is echoed in both
the Warren and Brandeis, and Prosser law review articles. See generally War-
ren & Brandeis, supra note 19; Prosser, supra note 49. Dean Prosser writes
that "[o]n the public street, or in any other public place, the plaintiff has no
right to be alone...." Prosser, supra note 49, at 391.
56. 162 So. 2d 474 (Ala. 1964).
57. Id. at 478.
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"blown up by the air jets and her body was exposed from the
waist down" except for the portion covered by her undergar-
ments.58 A photographer simultaneously took a picture of the
scene and published it in a local paper with limited circula-
tion.59 Notably, the Restatement authors included an illustra-
tion that borrowed heavily from the facts in Daily Times De-
mocrat that acknowledges a potential tort cause of action
even in a public setting.0
2. Privacy Rights under the Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment afforded courts the earliest op-
portunity to articulate privacy rights in the context of gov-
ernment and citizen interactions. The idea that such a right
existed was first articulated by Thomas Cooley, writing that
the "maxim that 'every man's house is his castle' is made a
part of our constitutional law in the clause prohibiting unrea-
sonable searches and seizures" from governmental intrusion.1
In 1886, the Supreme Court "first specifically wed the notion
of privacy to the guarantee against unreasonable searches
and seizures in the Fourth Amendment" when it articulated
the "'privacies of life' which guarded against the govern-
ment's seizure of imported items from the defendants.62
In 1928, Louis Brandeis re-emerged in the privacy con-
text with his dissent in Olmstead v. United States.5 Justice
Brandeis drew upon his earlier article with Warren when he
linked the Fourth Amendment's protection with the "right to
be let alone."' Brandeis wrote in his dissent that the authors
of the Constitution:
58. Id. at 476.
59. Id.
60. The illustration is as follows:
A, a young woman, attends a "Fun House," a public place of amuse-
ment where various tricks are played upon visitors. While she is there
a concealed jet of compressed air blows her skirt over her head, and re-
veals her underwear. B takes a photograph of her in that position. B
has invaded A's privacy.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 53, § 652B cmt. c, illus. 7.
61. THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATION
WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN
UNION 299-300 (Da Capo Press 1972).
62. See Gormley, supra note 18, at 1359 (citing Boyd v. United States, 116
U.S. 616 (1886)).
63. 277 U.S. 438, 471-88 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
64. See Gormley, supra note 18, at 1360 (noting that Brandeis's dissent
showed his strong convictions on this matter).
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conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let
alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right
most valued by civilized men. To protect that right, every
unjustifiable intrusion by the Government upon the pri-
vacy of the individual... must be deemed a violation of
the Fourth Amendment.65
Regarding nascent wiretapping technology, which was
used by the Government against the defendant, Brandeis
warned that it afforded the government power by allowing
"disclosure in court of what is whispered in the closet.,
66
In 1967, the Court revisited the use of eavesdropping de-
vices in Katz v. United States.7  In the intervening forty
years, surveillance technology became intricately more so-
phisticated than the simple wire-tap implicated in
Olmstead68  The Court held in Katz that the "Fourth
Amendment protects people, not places,"69 reflecting the
Court's acknowledgement that contrary to its ruling in
Olmstead, an invasion could occur absent a physical intru-
sion.7 ° Justice Harlan's concurring opinion went on to state
that a citizen has a "reasonable expectation of privacy"
against searches and seizures based upon a two-prong test.
71
First, one must have a subjective expectation of privacy.72
Second, the expectation must be one that society accepts as
reasonable.73
In the intervening years, courts addressed the concept of
reasonable expectations of privacy with respect to an individ-
ual's garbage,74 dog-sniffing checkpoints,75  and overhead
flights by the police.76  The last example demonstrates how
advances in technology have diminished the expected privacy
65. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 478.
66. Id. at 473. Brandeis used the same reference to a "closet" image in this
comment as he did in his earlier law review article. See Warren & Brandeis,
supra note 19, at 195.
67. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
68. See Gormley, supra note 18, at 1363-64 (chronicling the exponential
growth and concern over new technologies for surveillance).
69. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
70. Id. at 352-53.
71. Id. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring).
72. Id. at 361.
73. Id.
74. See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988).
75. See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
76. See California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
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of individuals. The Court ruled no expectation of privacy ex-
isted in a citizen's backyard "[i]n an age where private and
commercial flight in the public airways is routine.77
The Court's reasoning, thus, could permit "new techno-
logical innovations... [to] render unreasonable those privacy
expectations that were once reasonable."78 However, in Smith
v. Maryland,7" the Court addressed this possibility in dicta.
The Court noted that the government could not eliminate an
individual's expectation of privacy by "announc[ing] on na-
tionwide television that all homes henceforth would be sub-
ject to warrantless entry, individuals thereafter might not in
fact entertain any actual expectation of privacy regarding
their homes, papers, and effects.""
In 2001, the Court further refined the expectation of pri-
vacy standard in Kyllo v. United States.81 By this time, sur-
veillance tools had reached a level of sophistication whereby
police could use thermal imaging devices to detect heat ema-
nating from homes. The Court ruled five to four in Kyllo
that the use of such a device did constitute a search. 3 The
ruling was narrowly applied only to situations involving a
homeowner's expectation of privacy and limited to technologi-
cal devices that were not in use by the general public.' The
Court clearly acknowledged that new technologies had
shrunk the realm of what was considered private and out of
the reach of Government's view." Justice Scalia, writing for
the majority, summarized that the Court decision in the case
would determine "what limits there are upon this power of
technology to shrink the realm of guaranteed privacy."86 The
ruling has been characterized as the Court's "first step in suc-
cessfully translating the original understanding of the Consti-
77. Id. at 215.
78. Note, Privacy, Technology and the California 'Anti-Paparazzi" Statute,
112 HARV. L. REV. 1367, 1374 (1995).
79. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
80. Id. at 740 n.5. See also Dorothy Glancy, At the Intersection of the Visi-
ble and Invisible Worlds: United States Privacy and the Internet, 16 SANTA
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 357, 364 n.24 (2000).
81. 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
82. See id.
83. Id. at 40.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 33-34.
86. Id. at 34.
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tution into the electronic age." 7 For now, the Court appears
to have held back the intrusive advances of technology in a
citizen's privacy at his or her doorstep.
The continued refinement of the reasonable expectation
of privacy in adjudicating Fourth Amendment cases jurispru-
dence has important ramifications outside the criminal law
context, as violations of state and local statutes against pri-
vacy invasions are based upon the same test.88
3. Fundamental Decisional Privacy
Despite the privacy protections under Fourth Amend-
ment jurisprudence, Justice Stewart in the Katz opinion
noted that "the Fourth Amendment cannot be translated into
a general constitutional 'right to privacy.' That Amendment
protects individual privacy against certain kinds of govern-
mental intrusion"89 Such a general right outside the scope of
the Fourth Amendment was recognized in Griswold v. Con-
necticut,"° which involved a Connecticut law prohibiting the
use or provision of contraceptives. Justice Douglas declared
that "specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penum-
bras [in the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth and Ninth Amend-
ments], formed by emanations from those guarantees that
help give them life and substance."9' The penumbras of the
singled out amendments, collectively, contained in them the
implied power to "create zones of privacy." 2 Justice Douglas
declared that "privacy surrounding the marriage relation-
ship" was one such zone, and thus allowed for the use of con-
traceptives unfettered by government intrusion.93
After Griswold, the Court ruled on a series of cases that
established a constitutional right to privacy in areas other
than marriage. 4 In 1973, the Court added the right to an
87. Jeffrey Rosen, A Victory for Privacy, WALL ST. J., June 18, 2001, at A18.
88. See Legal Loopholes Protect Video Voyeurs, at
http://66.102.7.104/search?q=cache:kb9lOABZboYJ:www.cnn.com/2005/LAW/02/
08/video.voyeur.ap/+cnn+video+voyeurs+loopholes&hl=en&client=firefox-a
(posted on Feb. 8, 2005) (on file with the Santa Clara Law Review); discussion
infra Part II.B.
89. 389 U.S. at 350.
90. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
91. Id. at 484.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 486.
94. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (most recently ruling
on constitutional privacy in 2003).
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abortion as an accepted zone of privacy in the Roe v. Wade
decision.95 In Roe, the Court determined that the liberty
clause in the Fourteenth Amendment provided the "penum-
bra" under which a woman could chose to have an abortion.
96
Justice Blackmun wrote that "[t]his right of privacy, whether
it be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of per-
sonal liberty and restrictions upon state action, . . . is broad
enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to
terminate her pregnancy.
This right has become known as the "decisional" aspect of
constitutional privacy, by safeguarding decisions made by in-
dividuals.98 In practice, the Court has been circumspect in
expanding the list of privacy protected zones, limiting them to
rights relating to marriage, procreation, conception, family re-
lationships, child rearing and education.99
The technologies that spurred the Court's recognition of a
constitutional right to privacy, contraceptive and abortion
procedures, was clearly mingled with "religious, moral and
safety concerns.""'  These were not paramount issues with a
prior technological trigger, but the effect of these medical ad-
vances led to the reshaping of privacy laws, in much the same
way cameras and wire tapping equipment resulted in more
privacy protections under common law and the Fourth
Amendment. 1
4. Privacy Protections from State Constitutions
As a direct result of the Court rulings in Katz and Gris-
wold, many state legislatures began in the early 1970s to in-
tegrate a specific clause protecting privacy in their state con-
stitutions.1 "2 For example, California's Constitution reads
95. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
96. Id. at 152-53.
97. Id. at 153.
98. Decisional privacy is also described as fundamental-decisional privacy,
reflecting the fact that this type of privacy is based on fundamental rights in
how citizens make decisions regarding their own lives.
99. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 712-13 (1976) (recognizing "'zones of pri-
vacy'" which refined to be defined as those which were "'fundamental" or "'im-
plicit in the concept of ordered liberty.'").
100. See Gormley, supra note 18, at 1404 (noting that conceptive use and
abortions were not new to society, but they had reached a level of perfection by
the time of the fundamental-decisional privacy cases).
101. See id.
102. Id. at 1423-24 (surveying state responses to Katz, Griswold, and Roe as
Vol: 45690
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that "[aill people are by nature free and independent and
have inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and de-
fending life and liberty.., and pursuing and obtaining safety,
happiness, and privacy.?" 3 The remaining states have not ex-
plicitly written a right to privacy into their constitutions, but
have found privacy "buried within the nooks, crannies and
homegrown penumbras of their own constitutions."0 " In the
years following the more formal recognition of a constitu-
tional right to privacy and state acknowledgement, state
courts have proved to be useful in exploring the outer con-
tours of privacy laws that the Court has yet to examine. °'
C. Recent Laws Affecting Camera Phone Technology
With the proliferation of camera phones, states may play
a leading role in testing out new laws or applying existing
statutes to address the technology. The difficulty in distin-
guishing between a camera phone and a regular phone will
make detecting a violation difficult.' 6 States may choose to
look to their local city municipalities for direction, as these
entities have been actively contemplating camera phone re-
striction; 7 guidance from the federal government has been
somewhat forthcoming with the enactment of the Video Vo-
yeurism Prevention Act of 2004.108
1. Municipal Statutes
Local municipalities throughout the United States also
have or are contemplating prohibitions against such use."9
The Chicago City Counsel banned the use of camera phones
in public bathrooms and lockers last year and is now contem-
plating a ban in checkout lines and at ATM machines."' An
motivating privacy revisions to state constitutions).
103. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1.
104. Gormley, supra note 18, at 1425.
105. Id at 1425-27.
106. Unlike cameras or video equipment, camera phones do not distinguish
themselves to individuals who are being photographed. Thus, the presence of
cell phones aimed at an individual would not raise the same concerns as if
someone were pointing a camera in his or her direction.
107. See discussion infra Part II.C.1.
108. The Act signed by President Bush limits the use of unauthorized photo-
graphing on federal property and military bases only. See discussion infra Part
II.C.2.a.
109. Napolitano, supra note 10.
110. Erin Gwinn, Window on the World, CHICAGO TRIBUNE ONLINE EDITION
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attempt by the town of Seven Hills, Ohio, however, to ban the
use of camera phones in certain public places, was recently
scrapped amid fears of possible challenges and, ultimately,
the city deciding that the matter would be best left to a state
or federal action."' Other municipalities have attempted a
complete ban on camera phone use in certain public facili-
ties. 112
2. State and Federal Responses
Current anti-voyeurism and anti-paparazzi laws share
similar goals in protecting individuals from privacy invasion
that can be perpetrated by camera phone abuse."' Current
laws, however, have had limited success in dealing with the
special nature of the phones-their ability to surreptitious
capture and instantly transmit images over the Internet.'
a. Anti- Voyeuism Lawd 5
Existing laws against voyeurism have been the first line
of defense against inappropriate use of camera phones. How-
ever, these laws share the same limitations that the common
law of privacy torts possess-the resistance by courts to pro-
vide any protection to individuals in a public setting resulting
in a legal loophole in most existing laws.1
6
On December 1, 2003, a Washington state resident, Jack
Le Vu, was the first person in the nation charged for a crimi-
nal act while using his camera phone to photograph females
June 10, 2004, at http://www.chicagotribune.com/technology/reviews/chi-
0406090346junl0,1,7049153.story?coll=chi-technologyreviews-
utl&ctrack=2&cset=true (on file with the Santa Clara LawResview).
111. Napolitano, supra note 10 (citing possible suits based upon citizen's
need to use a phone during emergencies).
112. Id.
113. Of the two, however, only the anti-voyeurism law has been successful in
obtaining a conviction. See discussion infra Part II.C.2.a.
114. Legal Loopholes Protect Video Voyeurs, supra note 88.
115. For a survey of voyeurism laws, see Video Voyeurs, Aug. 13, 2002, at
http://www.g4tv.com/techtvvault/features/36824/VideoVoyeurs.html (last vis-
ited Apr. 21, 2005) (on file with the Santa Clara Law Review); Lance E. Rothen-
berg, Re-thinking Privacy: Peeping Toms, Video Voyeurs, and the Failure of
Criminal Law to Recognize a Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in the Public
Space, 49 AM. U. L. REV. 1127, 1150-65 (2000).
116. Mark S. Sullivan, Law May Curb Cell Phone Camera Use, July 23,
2004, at http://msn.pcworld.com/news/article/0,aid,1 17035,00.asp (last visited
Apr. 21, 2005) (on file with the Santa Clara Law Review).
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from beneath their dresses (referred to as "upskirt" photos).117
The victim noticed the defendant with his cellular phone but
did not suspect anything until a witness reported that the de-
fendant had crouched under the victim, then stood up and be-
gan looking at his phone."8 The defendant was successfully
convicted and later plead guilty to one count of voyeurism; he
was sentenced to sixty days in jail and was required to regis-
ter as a sex offender."9
The case was an important test for Washington's revised
voyeurism law, which borrowed from a similar California
statue that expanded the right to privacy in the public set-
ting. '2 It was enacted in 2002 after the Washington State
Supreme Court ruled that the previous law failed to protect
another victim of an "upskirt" incident where the defendants
used conventional cameras and video cameras. 2' The ruling
by the court highlighted the major difficulty in using voyeur-
ism laws to control camera phone use: the lack of a formal
recognition of privacy in public places. 2' Except for a few ex-
ceptions, the Washington Supreme Court cited extensive legal
history when it emphasized the lack of privacy afforded to
those who venture out in public areas."'
The court focused on the fact that "the physical location
of the person ... [is what] is ultimately at issue, not the part
of the person's body.""' 4 Accordingly, even though the defen-
dant "engaged in disgusting and reprehensible behavior,"
125
the court concluded that the previous law did "not apply to
117. Leslie Fulbright, Man Pleads Not Guilty to Taking Photos Up Skirt,
SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 10, 2003, at Al.
118. Id.
119. Sullivan, supra note 116.
120. See WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.44.115 (2005). The revised statute added
among other things subsection (2)(b) that specified an act of voyeurism occurs
when "intimate areas of another person [are filmed] without that person's
knowledge and consent and under circumstances where the person has a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy, whether in a public or private place." Id.
121. State v. Glas, 54 P.3d 147 (Wash. 2002).
122. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
123. Glas, 54 P.3d at 150-51. For a comprehensive treatment of case law
supporting no privacy in public in the context of taking photographs, see Phillip
E. Hassman, Annotation, Taking Unauthorized Photographs as Invasion of Pri-
vacy, 86 A.L.R. 3d 374 (2000). But see Daily Times Democrat v. Graham, 162
So. 2d 474, 478 (Ala. 1964) (recognizing invasion of privacy on particular facts
for a plaintiff in a public place).
124. Glas, 54 P.3d at 150.
125. Id. at 154.
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actions taken in purely public places and hence does not pro-
hibit the 'upskirt' photographs they took."'26 The court ac-
knowledged that the law had sought to protect citizens by "ex-
pand[ing] the locations where a person would possess a
reasonable expectation of privacy beyond those of a tradi-
tional 'peeping tom," 127 but it did "not [go] so far as to include
public locations."2 '
Some state legislatures, however, notably California and
Hawaii, have crafted anti-voyeurism laws that give victims a
cause of action even if the event occurred in a public place.'29
Other states are in the process of revising their existing vo-
yeurism laws to reflect the advances in technology.30 The
California Senate legislative hearings regarding the law
noted that "a person would likely have a limited expectation
of privacy in a public place, in contrast with a locked dressing
room in a clothing store."' Still, the expansion of privacy
into the public space was an important concept that the
Washington Supreme Court noted when it said the California
law "focused on the nature of the invasion itself, rather than
where the crime was committed."'32 The statute's application,
however, is limited to a provision that the victim be identifi-
able, a provision added to help ensure the law's constitution-
ality.'33 Thus, perpetrators will escape prosecution if the im-
ages they took do not reveal any details that will link identity
126. Id.
127. Id. at 151.
128. Id.
129. CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(k)(1) (West 1999 & Supp. 2005) (referring to the
use of a "motion picture camera" in an area where one has a "reasonable expec-
tation of privacy"); HAW. REV. STAT. § 711-1111(d) (Year & Supp. 2005) (defining
a violation of privacy in the second degree when a person captures an image of
"another person's intimate area underneath clothing, by use of any device, and
such image is taken while that person is in a public place"). A "public place" is
defined as "an area generally open to public." Id. § 711-1112(2).
130. See generally Jerome R. Stockfisch, ligh-Tech Voyeurs Lead to Update
of Law, TAMPA BAY ONLINE NEWS, Jan. 5, 2004 (discussing Florida legislative
efforts to revise voyeurism statutes) (on file with the Santa Clara Law Review).
131. See Surreptitious Visual Recording for Sexual Gratification: Hearing on
A.B. 182 Before the Senate Committee on Public Safety, 1999-2000 Reg. Sess. 5
(Cal. 1999) [hereinafter Hearing on A.B 18-1.
132. State v. Glas, 54 P.3d 147, 151 (Wash. 2002).
133. See Erwin Chemerinksy, Newsgathering and Privacy Rights: Protecting
Pivacy From Technological Intrusions, 1999 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 183, 188-91
(1999) (arguing that the California law is valid because it "could meet strict
scrutiny as being narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling purpose," or the law
could also be validated on a lower level of scrutiny).
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of the victim to the photograph. 13 4
The Video Voyeurism Prevention Act of 2004 was signed
into law in December 2004 and reflects federal efforts to
thwart video voyeurism. The Act aims to prohibit knowingly
capturing by videotape, photograph, film, or any electronic
means an improper image that would violate individual pri-
vacy, in situations where an individual had a reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy.3 ' Though the law is limited only to pub-
lic space on federal lands such as national parks and federal
buildings, the authors opine that it can be used as a basis for
further state efforts in the privacy realm.'36 Notably, the fed-
eral effort creates an expansion of privacy protections to pub-
lic places in an effort to stem the realities of current techno-
logical advances.137
b. Californias Anti3-Papara8zz1 3 Statute
The death of Princess Diana in 1997 resulted in efforts to
create civil liability for the overzealous actions of the press
with California passing the nation's first anti-paparazzi stat-
ute in 1999."' Opponents of the law claimed it would be un-
constitutional on vagueness and First Amendment grounds,
but supporters, such as noted constitutional scholar Professor
Erwin Chemerinksy, argued that the law was "clearly consti-
tutional, " ' since it applied "where the expectations of privacy
are the greatest and where there are only minimal First
Amendment interests involved."'41
The notable characteristic of the law is that it creates a
134. As implied by the terms, "upskirting" and "downskirting" images gener-
ally do not include the face of the victim.
135. Details of the law's development available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/bdquery/z?d108:SN01301:@@@L&summ2=m&#rel-bill-detail (last visited
Mar. 14, 2005) (on file with the Santa Clara Law Review).
136. H.R. REP. No. 108-504, at 2-3 (2004) (amending Title 18 of the United
States Code by inserting Chapter 88 on Privacy and providing commentary on
the law's purpose and background).
137. Senator Mike DeWine, Protecting Privacy in Public and at Home, THE
HILL, Sept. 10, 2003 (quoting bill co-author, Senator Mike DeWine (R-Ohio)), at
http://www.hillnews.com/news/091003/ss-dwine.aspx (last visited Apr. 21, 2005)
(on file with the Santa Clara Law Review).
138. See LA DOLCE VITA (Riama Films 1960) (referring to pestering photog-
raphers as "paparazzi"-Italian for mosquitoes).
139. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1708.8(b) (West 1998 & Supp. 2005).
140. Chemerinksy, supra note 134, at 191.
141. Id.
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constructive invasion of privacy."' The statute creates liabil-
ity for actions that constitute an invasion of privacy by use of
auditory or visual enhancing technologies but do not involve
an actual physical trespass." Professor Chemerinksy rea-
soned that "the existing tort law of trespass and privacy [from
Prosser's earlier work] is based on concepts of physical intru-
sion. There is a need to expand this law to create a cause of
action against those who use technological enhancing equip-
ment to accomplish the same invasions of privacy."'' The
California Senate's analysis of the "constructive" invasion
prong echoed the arguments of Professor Chemerinsky in that
an invasion of privacy cause of action could proceed even
without a physical trespass against the victim.1
45
The statute's "constructive invasion" element requires
that there exists a "reasonable expectation of privacy,"'46 thus
sharing the same standard as California's voyeurism law and
the Fourth Amendment test promulgated by the Supreme
Court under Katz.147 Though the test's application is rooted in
criminal search and seizure cases,1 4' both the legislative re-
cord and Professor Chemerinsky's analysis of the law indicate
that California's civil statute lifts the crucial test from the
Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.'
142. The pertinent section reads as follows:
A person is liable for constructive invasion of privacy when the defen-
dant attempts to capture, in a manner that is offensive to a reasonable
person, any type of visual image... of the plaintiff engaging in a per-
sonal or familial activity under circumstances in which the plaintiff
had a reasonable expectation of privacy,. .. regardless of whether
there is a physical trespass, if this image .... could not have been
achieved without a trespass unless the visual... enhancing device was
used.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1708.8(b).
143. Chemerinksy, supra note 134, at 183.
144. Id.
145. See Hearing on A.B. 182, supra note 132.
146. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1708.8(b) (referring to circumstances where one has a
.reasonable expectation of privacy").
147. CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(k)(1) (referring to an area where one has a "rea-
sonable expectation of privacy"); Katz, 389 U.S. at 361.
148. See discussion supra Part II.B.2.
149. See Invasion of Privacy: Damages.- Hearing on A.B. 262 Before the As-
sembly Committee on Judiciary, 1997-1998 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1998) [hereinafter
Hearing on A.B. 264. See generally Chemerinksy, supra note 134, at 186-87;
Andrew D. Morton, Much Ado About Newsgathering: Personal Privacy, Law En-
forcement, and the Law of Unintended Consequences for Anti-Paparazzi Legis-
lation, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 1435, 1464-68 (1999) (discussing state statutes using
the "reasonable expectations" standard).
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III. IDENTIFICATION OF THE LEGAL PROBLEM
The unique threat caused by camera phones is the mar-
riage of surreptitious photography matched with the instan-
taneous ability to transfer the images worldwide through the
Internet."' Camera phones give any individual, not just the
press, police, or paparazzi, the discrete ability to simultane-
ously capture, store, and disseminate images and video of
others. Currently, this threat to privacy is only haphazardly
addressed by local,' state, and federal laws.'52 It would cer-
tainly be a dire result if unchecked camera phone use re-
stricted an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy to
"stay inside your house with the blinds closed."'53
The way in which courts and legislatures choose to react
to camera phones has potentially far reaching implications,
not only in addressing proper camera phone use, but as a
template to address future technology that shares the same
potent characteristics of camera phones. The initial re-
sponses have been the simple prohibition of the technology's
use in certain locations such as in health clubs. Current anti-
voyeurism and anti-paparazzi laws could attempt to regulate
the use of camera phones.' Ultimately, the rights of citizens
would be best served with a coherent, workable approach that
sets clear legal boundaries for camera phone use and that
could apply to future technologies that share the device's
characteristics discussed above.
IV. ANALYSIS
Addressing camera phones use implicates two legal theo-
ries: first, whether there can be any right to privacy in a pub-
lic setting;55 and, second how technology has adjusted to what
150. The seamless ability to capture, store, and disseminate on an internet-
wide scale is different than the threat poised by conventional camera or video
devices that do not have the ability to instantaneously broadcast the images
captured. Whereas, an individual can reasonably suspect that a camera pointed
at them is being used to take his or her photo, a similarly directed cell phone
would not normally raise such a suspicion.
151. See Napolitano, supra note 10. At this time, local municipalities and
health clubs have been most active in addressing the matter. Id.
152. See discussion supra Part II.C.2.
153. See generally McClurg, supra note 54, at 990.
154. See discussion supra Part II.C.2.
155. See discussion infra Parts IV.A-IV.B.
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society expects as a reasonable expectation of privacy. 5 6
Reaching an acceptable response to both will assist in forging
a robust legal solution. Privacy in a public setting is gener-
ally an unrecognized right under the common law and crimi-
nal application of the Fourth Amendment. 57
A. Privacy in Public Places
1. Common and Civil Law Context
Recent laws have been chipping away at the lack of rec-
ognition by finding a cause of action under certain circum-
stances and in certain locations. Proposed and existing local
laws against the use of camera phones are focused on where a
citizen has a reasonable expectation of privacy in public loca-
tions such as public showers and changing rooms.' Local of-
ficials appear to be more willing to err on the side of safety
than allowing camera equipped cell phone users unfettered
freedom of use while in a public setting.5 9 Eventually, how-
ever, these statutes may face challenges as they impinge
upon the general freedoms of cell phone users.
On a national level, the scope of the federal anti-
voyeurism law's intends to cover camera phone use as well. 6'
156. See discussion infra Part IV.C.
157. See discussion supra Parts II.B.1-II.B.2. The definition of "public" set-
ting was not explicitly developed in either of the articles by Warren and
Brandeis or Prosser. However, both articles defined by example what was con-
sidered public, such as putting oneself in the public domain or walking on a
street. See Prosser, supra note 49, at 391-92; Warren & Brandeis, supra note
19, at 199-200. For purposes of this article, the term "public space" will reflect
any location an individual is not restricted by statute or property rights. For
example, the case of California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988), stood for the
proposition that an individual's garbage was in the public setting and thus free
of the limitations of the Fourth Amendment.
158. Napolitano, supra note 10.
159. Id. One such official, Chicago's Elk Grove Park District Commissioner,
Ron Nunes, commented on the ban of cameras in park showers by saying he
would "'rather protect the children and the public more than someone who
wants to call home and see what's for dinner.'" Id.
160. Id. Attorney L. Richard Fischer noted that "'Iy]ou have to do it [passing
camera phone laws] very selectively or you really are treading on people's
rights.'" Id. See also A. Michael Froomkin, Cyberspace and Privacy A New Le-
galParadigm? The Death of Privacy 52 STAN. L. REV. 1461, 1511 (2000) (citing
restrictions on general photography implicating First Amendment rights).
161. Video Voyeurism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-495, 118 Stat.
3999 (codified as 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. § 1801 (2004)) (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. §
1801). See Jennifer Wolcott, Cellphone Cameras Ring Warning Bells,
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But, the bill averts the bulk of the problem by focusing solely
on federal lands and avoiding any jurisdiction over regular
public settings. Indeed, the bill's goal is "just trying to define
the problem and take a rifle-shot approach."'62 State efforts to
carve out a privacy cause of action in a public setting have not
yet been tested by the appellate process. '  In fact, only one
known conviction of camera phone use exists under Washing-
ton's revised anti-voyeurism statute.' 64
The precedent from Daily Times Democrat, however, in-
dicates that the rights of the general public to see and collect
data by photographic means can be curtailed by a privacy
tort.16' In Daily )'mes Democrat, the court rebuffed the de-
fendant's general First Amendment claim by noting that the
photograph of the plaintiff was not newsworthy and, thus not
afforded the usual protections of speech and the press.'6 6 The
defendant also claimed that since the photograph was taken
at a public setting, the plaintiff had no cause of action under
an invasion of privacy tort.'6 7 The court dispensed with the
argument by stating that a "purely mechanical application of
legal principles [no privacy in public setting] should not be
permitted to created an illogical conclusion."6 The "illogical
conclusion" that the court sought to avoid was "[t]o hold that
one who is involuntarily and instantaneously enmeshed in an
embarrassing pose forfeits her right of privacy merely be-
cause she happened at the moment to be part of a public
scene." 169 The lack of volition on the part of the plaintiff al-
lowed her recovery under the privacy tort. Nothing in the
ruling limited other potential circumstances from carving out
another exception to the general rule of no privacy in a public
setting. Thus, the significance of the Daily Times Democrat
CHRISTIAN SC. MONITOR, Nov. 7, 2003, at 13 (quoting the press secretary of co-
sponsor Representative Oxley, who indicated that the bill, if passed, would fine
individuals who took pictures with camera phones on federal lands).
162. Wolcott, supra note 162.
163. Lexis-Nexis search conducted on February 10, 2005 of state appellate
decisions yielded no results from the representative statutes of California, Ha-
waii, or Washington.
164. See supra notes 117-19 and accompanying text discussing the case of
Jack Vu.
165. See Froomkin, supra note 161, at 1509.
166. Daily Times Democrat, 162 So. 2d at 477.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 478.
169. Id.
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ruling is that it allowed any other court to create its own ex-
ception under a different set of circumstances.'
2. Criminal Law Context
Prior to Kyllo, the Supreme Court clearly followed the
generalization that what was held out to be public was af-
forded no protections from Fourth Amendment protections. 7'
Certainly, under the reasonable expectation test promulgated
under the Katz ruling, individuals had no expectation of pri-
vacy in a public setting.
172
The Court in Kyllo, however, appears to have carved out
an exception to the general rule much the same as the Daily
Times Democrat court did in the common law. Notably, the
Court rejected Justice Steven's contention that since the resi-
dent's heat waves were exposed to the public like garbage or a
backyard, it was unreasonable to have an expectation of pri-
vacy. 173  Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, countered
that the Katz "expectation of privacy" test had been "criti-
cized as circular, and hence subjective and unpredictable.' 74
He went on to state that there was a "minimal expectation of
privacy that exists" when it came to the interior of a home. 171
The Court held that a search was defined as "obtaining by
sense-enhancing technology any information regarding the
interior of the home that could not otherwise have been ob-
tained without physical 'intrusion into a constitutionally pro-
tected area,'.., at least where (as here) the technology in
question is not in general public use."'76
The Court's bright line rule stands as a backdrop for the
trend against prior jurisprudence that that held the public
has no Fourth Amendment protection.177 Whether the Court
170. McClurg, supra note 54, at 1046.
171. For example, the case of California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988),
stood for the proposition that an individual's garbage was in the public setting,
and, thus, an individual had no expectation of privacy.
172. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
For example, the case of Caifornia v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 215 (1986), allowed
surveillance of residential backyards by means of aerial photography.
173. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 44 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
174. Id. at 34.
175. Id. (emphasis omitted).
176. Id. (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961)) (in-
ternal citation omitted).
177. Justice Scalia may have hedged this question by specifying that the
technology need not be generally available to the public. From his opinion, one
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will hold narrowly to the facts of Kyllo or choose to extend its
principles of protection is yet to be seen, but the door seems to
have been left open for further rulings from the Court that
assign privacy rights to what is nonetheless exposed to the
public.
B. Reasonable Expectations Revisited
The test promulgated by the Court in Kyllo seemed to
distance itself from any use of Katis "reasonable expecta-
tions" test.' The Court instead spoke of a "minimal expecta-
tion of privacy" in devising its ruling. ' " The use of "reason-
able expectations" has been the foundation of the Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence since Katz and forms the basis for
many state statutes that serve to protect privacy rights of
citizens."' 0 Kyllds opinion may be the subtle recognition that
relying on the expectations of citizens, particularly with the
respect to ever-increasing technological advances, does not af-
ford them the protections envisioned by the authors of the
Constitution." Arguably, citizens could reasonably expect
that there is nothing done in their homes that could not be
heard or recorded by some sort of high-tech device, such as
those used in airports or seen in popular movies. Kyllo pre-
vents this loss of privacy, albeit only with respect to unique
technologies.
The erosion of privacy expectations has been clear in the
criminal law context."' The diminishing of privacy expecta-
could draw the conclusion that the key question was the sanctity of the place
being intruded upon-that of the interior of a home. If a technology that was
generally available could look inside the home, the Court would rule that use of
such a device by the police as a search.
178. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34 (noting criticism of the test, Justice Scalia proceeds
to deliver the holding without reference to "reasonable expectations" of the indi-
vidual or society). See also David Sullivan, A Bright Line in the Sky? Toward a
New Fourth Amendment Search Standard for Advancing Surveillance Technol-
ogy, 44 ARIz. L. REv. 967, 984 (discussing lack of explicit reference to the Katz
'reasonable" test in Justice Scalia's ruling).
179. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34.
180. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concur-
ring); discussion supra Part II.B.2.
181. See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34. Justice Scalia's opinion attempted to preserve
the privacy the authors of the Fourth Amendment afforded to citizens against
present and future technologies. By moving away from a "reasonable expecta-
tions" test to a "minimum" test, the Court's solution would appear to put less
faith in the former rule. See id,
182. See discussion supra Part II.B.2.
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tions is also evident in the common law tort of intrusion into
privacy.'83 Privacy expectations apparently are easily altered
when technology becomes more prevalent and courts recog-
nize fewer expectations for privacy held by citizens. The mat-
ter is worsened as society seems to desire more voyeuristic
news which further erodes what is expected to be reasonably
expected.'
Amidst this erosion, citizens face perhaps a more disturb-
ing problem with the Court's potential inability to even accu-
rately discern what is a "reasonable expectation" of privacy.
A study by professors Christopher Slobogin and Joseph
Schumacher recorded the expectations of privacy of two hun-
dred participants. 8' The study found that citizens' expecta-
tions did not equate with those the Court had ruled on in both
the criminal arena and in the workplace.' One author con-
cludes that perhaps "Supreme Court justices, who are se-
cluded in a marble palace.., aren't terribly good at predict-
ing how much privacy ordinary Americans expect in the
workplace."'87 It would appear that the subjective nature of
the test is not easily quantified by the Court, leaving the use-
fulness of the test further in question.
The "reasonable expectations" test, in both the criminal
and common law setting, may be ultimately ill equipped in
this new technological age to provide citizens sufficient pro-
tection of their privacy rights. Though the test is still the ac-
cepted norm and used in many privacy related statues, 8 8 citi-
zens may be better served with the bright line rule that Kyllo
attempted to create to accommodate existing and future tech-
nological advances. The key is formulating protection that
prevents "invasions [of privacy that] no citizen in a civilized
183. See discussion supra Part II.B.1.
184. See generally Note, Privacy, Technology and California's "Anti-
Paparazzi" Statute, supra note 78, at 1374-76 (noting that courts have seem-
ingly provided less privacy protection in the tort of intrusion with advancing
technologies and that changing social norms are more open to voyeuristic news,
thus, further eroding what one views as being a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy).
185. Christopher Slobgin & Joseph E. Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations
of Privacy and Autonomy in Fourth Amendment Cases An Empirical Look at
Understandings Recognized and Permitted by Society, 42 DUKE L.J. 727, 737
(1993).
186. Id. at 739, 742.
187. JEFFREY ROSEN, THE UNWANTED GAZE 62-63 (Random House 2000).
188. See discussion supra Part II.B.2.
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society should endure, regardless of whether expectations of
privacy have been diminished by technology.
189
V. PROPOSAL
This comment proposes a solution to address the privacy
concerns surrounding the use of camera phones and technolo-
gies with similar capabilities. The proposal would recognize a
right to privacy in a public setting where one would have a
minimum expectation of privacy. This "minimum expecta-
tion" standard is borrowed from Kyllo and would abandon the
use of the "reasonable expectations" test to determine
whether an individual has a right to privacy, a test which
continues to be eroded by technological advances. This new
right to a minimum expectation of privacy in a public setting
would allow the designation of certain locations that are pro-
tected from the use of any type of data gathering technology,
however surreptitious or obvious. Though this right would be
based a common law tort remedy, the use of the Kyllo stan-
dard of "minimum expectations" could help to further acceler-
ate the adoption of the standard in the criminal law setting.
A. Designated "Safe Places" Where Minimum Expectation of
Privacy Rights Exist
The Court in Kyllo designated an individual's home as a
location where the citizen had a "minimum expectation" of
privacy and where intrusion would not be allowed by technol-
ogy that was not readily available.9 ° Transferring its applica-
tion to non-criminal situations, a modified approach would
stipulate that in the public setting, there would exist certain
designated "safe areas" the use of any data gathering device,
irregardless of its availability. The targeted data gathering
devices would be any form of electronic device that enhances
an individual's natural senses. This definition would exclude
the trivial case of pencils, papers and even that of an individ-
ual's memory. In addition, by borrowing from the Court's
opinion in Kyllo, the new privacy right would be shielded
from challenges to its constitutionality.
How a "safe area" would be determined would left to the
discretion of local communities which have already begun this
189. Jeffrey Rosen, A Victory for P'ivacy, WALL ST. J., June 18, 2001, at Al.
190. See discussion supra Part II.B.2.
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process, designating areas in which individuals have a de
facto "safe area" created by statute.' Presumably, a resi-
dence, a changing room, and public bathrooms would be such
"safe areas." Thus, citizens do not have to guess whether it is
reasonable to be secure in a public restroom. As technology
advances, society still knows that in designated "safe areas,"
use of the new devices would be an illegal invasion into an-
other individual's privacy.
B. A Right to Privacy in Public Places
It would be impractical to completely ban the use of cam-
era phones or any future, similar technology. Enforcement is
also difficult since a victim would have to be reasonably cer-
tain that an individual pointing a cell phone in his or her di-
rection actually took an image. To strike a proper balance, a
multi-factor test would be able to balance the legitimacy of
the intrusion against any mitigating facts. Professor
McClurg proposed such a revision of the tort of intrusion that
adds "whether in a private physical area or one open to public
inspection" to the existing tort text.192
In order to determine if the act is offensive to a reason-
able person, the McClurg's suggested test advances seven fac-
tors to guide the determination.9 These tests help to prevent
191. See discussion supra Part II.C.1.
192. The Restatement (Second) of Torts defines "Intrusion upon Seclusion" as
"[o]ne who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or
seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to
the other for invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion would be highly offensive to
a reasonable person." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 53, §
652B. Professor McClurg suggests the following definition of "Intrusion upon
Seclusion:"
One who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the pri-
vate affairs or concerns of another, whether in a private physical area
or one open to public inspection, is subject to liability to the other for
invasion of her privacy, if the intrusion would be highly offensive to a
reasonable person.
McClurg, supra note 54, at 1058.
193. The seven factors are as follows:
1. the defendant's motive;
2. the magnitude of the intrusion, including the duration, extent, and
the means of intrusion;
3. whether the plaintiff could reasonably expect to be free from such
conduct under the habits and customs of the location where the intru-
sion occurred;
4. whether the defendant sought the plaintiffs consent to the intrusive
conduct;
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any and every perceived intrusion from clogging the courts.
For instance, an individual who takes random camera phone
shots on the street for his website would not likely be liable
because his motive was innocuous. If, however, he took pic-
tures that documented the daily whereabouts of a single indi-
vidual for consecutive days, posting them on his website and
advertising them to those who wished to harass the victim, he
would likely be liable for the tort of intrusion by implicating
several of its factors: motive, magnitude of the intrusion, and
dissemination of the information.
The test is particularly resilient with respect to current
technologies, such as normal cameras and camera phones, as
well as any future sort of device that might be able to record
even more data in even less obtrusive means. The test also
affords protection to legitimate uses of the camera phone. If
the images captured have a legitimate public interest, such as
the commission of a crime, the responsible party would be
immune from any civil action for his conduct. In addition, ac-
ceptance of this revised tort would ensure the legitimacy of
the various existing state statues regarding voyeurism.
VI. CONCLUSION
The nature of technology is that it advances. What often
retreats in reaction is privacy. The historic development of
American privacy, however, owes much of its creation to
technological catalysts that create new forms of privacy pro-
tections. One could muse that over one hundred years after
the extensive use of cameras spurred the birth of modern U.S.
privacy rights, cameras again are a trigger for yet another
chapter in the development of these rights.
At this junction, the formal recognition of privacy rights
in the public may be the most effective means of protection in
an era when technology is subtle yet certain to cause signifi-
5. actions taken by plaintiff which would manifest to a reasonable per-
son the plaintiffs desire that the defendant not engage in the intrusive
conduct;
6. whether the defendant disseminated images of the plaintiff or infor-
mation concerning the plaintiff that was acquired during the intrusive
act; and
7. whether images of or other information concerning the plaintiff ac-
quired during the intrusive act involve a matter of legitimate public in-
terest.
McClurg, supra note 54, at 1058-59.
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cant disruption to an individual's private space. Designations
of "safe places" would also ensure that citizens could expect
privacy in places other than their homes. These preemptive
efforts would certainly strengthen privacy rights by putting
society one step ahead of technology's reach.
